

## Chapter 6 : Modern symmetric encryption.

First, from here on we will work in binary.

So we'll have to think in sums of powers of 2 instead of powers of 10 from here on out.

$$\text{E.g. } 37 = 2^5 + 2^2 + 2^0$$

$$= 100101$$

$$\text{or } 7 = 2^2 + 2^1 + 2^0$$

$$= 111$$

Of course, we can still encrypt messages involving letters/punctuation etc, we just have to decide on a correspondence between letters/punctuation and binary numbers. Thankfully this is already done for us.

E.g. ASCII

American Standard Code for Information Interchange.

Each letter corresponds to a 5-digit (or 5-bit) binary string.

E.g.: HI becomes  $\underbrace{00111}_H \quad \underbrace{01000}_I$

The benefit of binary lies in the simplicity of operations on binary numbers and strings.

There's good old addition:

$$\begin{array}{r}
 \phantom{+} \phantom{1} \phantom{0} \phantom{1} \\
 \phantom{+} \phantom{1} \phantom{0} \phantom{1} \\
 + \phantom{1} \phantom{0} \phantom{1} \phantom{0} \\
 \hline
 1 \phantom{0} \phantom{0} \phantom{1} \phantom{0}
 \end{array}$$

or in more familiar notation: 
$$\begin{array}{r}
 13 \\
 + 5 \\
 \hline
 18
 \end{array}$$

$= 2^4 + 2^1 = 18$  (it checks out).

There's also "bitwise addition" where we just add the entries mod 2, with no carrying (ie use:  $0+0=0$ ,  $1+0=0+1=1$ ,  $1+1=0$ ).

Also called XOR (eXclusive Or). It's like this; written  $\oplus$ :

$$\begin{array}{r}
 001011101 \\
 \oplus 101111100 \\
 \hline
 100100001
 \end{array}$$

One of our first goals will be to use binary to generate from a relatively small key a long random-seeming string of 0's and 1's, useful in stream ciphers (for example).

### §6.2 Linear feedback shift registers.

Our notation will be the same as the book, meaning we have to think right-to-left.

An LFSR is a way of creating a new string of 0's and 1's from a set of "transition rules".

Example: We are going to transform the 4-bit string  $(b'_4, b'_3, b'_2, b'_1)$  into  $(b_4, b_3, b_2, b_1)$ . We write this as

$$(b_4, b_3, b_2, b_1) \longleftarrow (b'_4, b'_3, b'_2, b'_1)$$

To describe the change, we write "transition rules":

$$\begin{array}{l} b_3 \leftarrow b'_4 \quad b_2 \leftarrow b'_3 \\ b_1 \leftarrow b'_2 \quad b_4 \leftarrow b'_1 + b'_2 \end{array}$$

To make this notation make sense, we can read the arrow " $\leftarrow$ " as "comes from". So, with the rules above,

1011 corresponds to  $b'_4 = 1, b'_3 = 0, b'_2 = 1, b'_1 = 1$  and it is transformed into

$$\begin{array}{c} 0101 \\ \uparrow \quad \uparrow \\ b_3 \leftarrow b'_2, \text{ etc.} \\ \underline{\underline{b_4 \leftarrow b'_1 + b'_2}} \end{array}$$

In general, a LFSR is a single formula, such as

$$b_{(n)} \leftarrow b'_1 + b'_2 + b'_4$$

where the subscript on the left indicates the size of the string, and the formula indicates the only "non-trivial" transition rule. I.e. all other transition rules are of the form  $b_i \leftarrow b'_{i+1}$ .

An initial value used to compute subsequent strings is called the seed for the register.

Example continued: Using the LFSR  $b_4 \leftarrow b'_1 + b'_2$  above, and a seed of 0010, we can compute a table of subsequent strings:

| Step | string |   |   |           |
|------|--------|---|---|-----------|
| 0    | 0      | 0 | 1 | 0 ← seed. |
| 1    | 1      | 0 | 0 | 1         |
| 2    | 1      | 1 | 0 | 0         |
| 3    | 0      | 1 | 1 | 0         |
| 4    | 1      | 0 | 1 | 1         |
| 5    | 0      | 1 | 0 | 1         |
| 6    | 1      | 0 | 1 | 0         |
|      |        |   |   | ⋮         |

note this column may seem totally random to someone who does not know the rule  $b_4 \leftarrow b_1 + b_2$ .

The column on the right will eventually repeat, since there are at most  $2^4 = 16$  arrangements of four zeroes and 1's.

We can use these bitstreams for stream ciphers.

Example: Consider the LFSR  $b_4 \leftarrow b_1 + b_2 + b_4$ , seeded with 0110. We start computing states, and get:

| step | string |
|------|--------|
| 0    | 0110   |
| 1    | 1011   |
| 2    | 1101   |
| 3    | 0110   |
| 4    | 1011   |
| 5    | ⋮      |

repeats soon!

Now to encrypt a message like "HELP" we write it in binary using ASCII, get:

|              |                |              |              |              |
|--------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| plaintext    | 00111          | 00100        | 01011        | 01111        |
|              | <sup>H</sup>   | <sup>E</sup> | <sup>L</sup> | <sup>P</sup> |
| keystream    | ⊕ 01101        | 10110        | 11011        | 01101        |
|              | <sup>XOR</sup> |              |              |              |
| ciphertext   | 01010          | 10010        | 10000        | 00010        |
| change back: | K              | S            | Q            | C            |

To decrypt: Pass the rule  $b_4 \leftarrow b_1 + b_2 + b_4$  to the intended recipient. They generate the same keystream: 011011011... etc.

Then XOR the ciphertext with the keystream, taking advantage of the fact that subtraction mod 2 is the same as addition mod 2! So:

|            |            |          |
|------------|------------|----------|
| ciphertext | 01010100   | ...      |
| keystream  | ⊕ 01101101 | ...      |
| plaintext  | 00111001   | ... etc. |

Remark: If we chose a LFSR with many bits, then it might not repeat for a long time, unlike the previous example. In general, a LFSR

$$b_k \leftarrow \text{some equation}$$

doesn't necessarily repeat before the  $2^k$ -th step (though some might repeat much sooner). So we could potentially communicate only a simple equation and a length  $k$  seed, and generate a string  $\sim 2^k$  bits long that is "effectively random" to an observer.

In fact, we could make the formula public! The seed alone will generate a keystream for the intended recipient, and an eavesdropper would still be lost as to how to generate the keystream.

§6.3 : A vulnerability: Known plaintext attacks.

Recall we want a system where an eavesdropper that somehow discovers a large chunk of our plaintext will still be thwarted.

So suppose that someone knows the LFSR we're using (ie the formula). We send the ciphertext

WIMSUJ

using  $b_4 \leftarrow b_4 + b_1$ . Our seed is secret.

Unfortunately, an eavesdropper finds out that the first two letters are "MR".

ciphertext : 1011001000 .....

they know : 0110010001 .....

← plaintext.

Since addition mod 2 is the same as subtraction, they need only XOR these to get the start of the keystream:

keystream: 1101011001

So if we imagine filling in our LFSR table:

